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Abstract
Recently, the decisions of the Constitutional Court have become one of 
the focuses in the dynamics of Indonesian state administration. This research 
discusses the relevance of political constellation in Indonesia and its influence 
on the changing character of several constitutional court decisions from self-
executing to non-self executing. This research aims to find out how the legal 
impact of shifting the character of the Constitutional Court’s decision in its 
implementation. This research is a normative study supported by a law, case 
and conceptual approach. The data used are secondary data, obtained by means 
of a literature research which is then arranged systematically and analyzed with 
qualitative analysis. From the results of the analysis it is known that the shift in 
the character in several decisions of the Constitutional Court was carried out as 
an effort to offset the political constellation in the legislators. The character shift 
is done in the hope that it can guarantee the execution of the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling and can be followed up on by the decision of the ruling. This 
shows that Constitutional Court judges are trying to find a legal breakthrough in 
the corridor of judicial activism to make an ideal constitutional review decision.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The written constitution is in principle, the most important legal and political 
remedy for the implementation of constitutionality. Therefore it is necessary for the 
functioning of each democratic political system that a constitution is implemented. 
The top principle of existence and functioning of the democratic society and a 
state governed by the rule of law is the supremacy of the Constitution, which 
is at the same time the principal concept of the constitutional review. In the 
constitutional review discourse, there is a firm conviction that law enforcement 
must be able to give meaning to the state system, especially to uphold basic 
human rights in the constitution.1 The diversity and complexity of successful 
constitutional cultures, that it is possible to conceive of many different yet equally 
reasonable ways to address each area of constitutional concern.2
The constitutional court’s power to supervise the development of ordinary 
law, however, will almost inevitably be limited.3 The ideas and legal theories 
of Kelsen and his model of the court as a negative legislator have influenced 
the design of specialized constitutional courts in the Western world. Kelsen, 
in accordance with his positivist jurisprudence, believed in a strict hierarchy 
of law and that ordinary judges should only apply a law that is legislated by 
the parliament. Kelsen believed that the constitution ought to be the supreme 
law of the land and that no statute could violate it.4 To effectively restrain the 
legislature and ensure the compatibility of law with the higher normative order 
of the constitution, Kelsen believed, a special, extrajudicial organ was necessary. 
The Kelsenian model establishes a centralized body outside of the structure 
of the conventional judiciary to exercise constitutional review and act as the 
guarantor of the constitutional order. This body, typically called a constitutional 
court, operates as a negative legislator because it has the power to reject but 
1  Lawrence M. Friedman, Hukum Amerika Sebuah Pengantar [American Law An Introduction], trans.Wishnu Basuki 
(Jakarta: PT. Tata Nusa, 2001), 252-253.
2  Ken I. Kersch, ”The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary and the Rule of Law,” Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 4, no.2 (2005): 367.
3 Mark Tushnet, “The issue of state action/horizontal effect in comparative constitutional law”, I.CON.International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 1, no. 1 (January 2003): 86.
4 Federico Fabbrini, “Kelsen in Paris: France’s Constitutional Reform and the Introduction of a Posteriori Constitutional 
Review of Legislation”, German Law Journal 9, no. 10 (2008): 1299.
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not propose legislation.5 Some features of constitutional courts also press them 
in the direction of activism.6
In the construction of the Indonesian Constitution, the institutions tasked 
with guarding and ensuring the constitutionality of the law are the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Indonesia (hereinafter abbreviated as MK). Through its 
decision, it not only fulfills the role of guarantor of constitutional supremacy but 
also contributes to the understanding and application of fundamental principles 
in the law or rule of law.7 The Constitutional Court can assess and decide the 
act that has been ratified by the President if it is true that the act passed by 
the President violates the normative provisions of the regulation above (in 
this case the 1945 Constitution). Therefore, the Constitutional Court can state 
that the Law is null and void in part or in the whole of the articles of the law 
submitted for “constitutional review”. Reviewing of the Act by the Constitutional 
Court is an assessment of political products created between the president and 
the legislative council or regional council on the material of a law. So that the 
product of the law created and approved by the president really does not conflict 
with the 1945 Constitution or the interests of community rights. In constitutional 
cases,8 whenever the text is vague, legislatures have a free choice in borderline 
cases and cannot be second-guessed by judges.
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia is one of the state 
institutions that always attract the attention of many circles, not least related 
to the decisions produced regarding the reviewing of laws. Initially the decision 
to review the law is only in the form of an amber that grants an application, 
declares that the application cannot be accepted and rejects the application for 
part or all by stating a law, article, paragraph or phrase contradicts the 1945 
5 Tom Ginsburg, “Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Political and Judicial Audiences,”Arizona Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 28, no. 3 (2011): 540.
6 Victor Ferreres Comella, “The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation:Toward Decentralization?” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 2, no.3 (2004): 484.
7 Daniela Cristina Valea, “The Role of the Romanian Constitutional Court in Protecting and Promoting Hu-
man Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,” accessed August 2, 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
tion/271880289_The_Role_of_the_Romanian_Constitutional_Court_in_Protecting_and_Promoting_Human_Fun-
damental_Rights_and_Freedoms.
8 Randy Barnett, “Interpretation and Construction,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy34, no. 12 2011: 69.
Shifting the Character of the Constitutional Court Decision Influenced by Political Constellation in Indonesia
333Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and states that it has no binding legal 
force (legally null and void).9 But today the Constitutional Court has also created 
a variant of the decision, namely a conditionally unconstitutional decision; a 
conditionally constitutional decision; decisions that delay the application of the 
decision (limited constitutional); and decisions that formulate new norms.10 The 
Constitutional Court through the four variants of the decision is often considered 
to have changed its role from negative legislature11 to positive legislature.12 
The Constitutional Court in this corridor made itself as the third room in the 
legislative process because it cannot be denied that the variant of the decision 
influenced the legislative process in the legislature. This is an external control 
tool that is owned by the Constitutional Court to carry out purification of the 
legal products produced by the legislative institution despite the polemic of the 
Constitutional Court as a positive legislature.
At the next level, the variant of the Constitutional Court’s decision as 
mentioned above carries its own dynamics in the character of the Constitutional 
Court’s decision. This can be seen from the decision which tends to need further 
regulation.13 Another thing that also needs to be considered is that considering 
the norms in the law are a unified system, there is an implementation of 
decisions that must go through certain stages that depend on the substance 
of the relevant decision. In this case, there are decisions that can be directly 
implemented without having to make new regulations or changes and some 
need further regulation first.14 When a decision will be effective immediately 
9 As stipulated in Article 56 paragraph (3) and Article 57 paragraph (1) of Law Number 8 of 2011 concerning 
Amendments to Law Number 24 of 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court.
10 Syukri Asy’ari, et.al, Model dan Implementasi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Pengujian Undang-Undang (Studi 
Putusan Tahun 2003-2012) [Model and Implementation of Constitutional Court Decisions in Constitutional Review 
(Study of Decisions of 2003-2012)] (Jakarta: Case Research and Assessment Center, Management of Information 
and Communication Technology of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2012), 2.
11 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), 286.
12 Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Constitutional Court as Positive Legislators: A Comparative Law Study (Cambridge: Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 8.
13 Martitah stated that the Constitutional Court’s decision had two characteristics, namely a verdict whose nature 
could be directly implemented and a verdict whose nature needed further regulation. See in Martitah, Mahkamah 
Konstitusi: Dari Negative Legislature ke Positive Legislature? [Constitutional Court: From Negative Legislature to 
Positive Legislature?] (Jakarta: Konspress, 2013), 28.
14 “Kekuatan Mengikat dan Pelaksanan Putusan MK [The Binding Strength and Implementation of the Constitutional 
Court’s Decision],” Muchamad Ali Safa’at, accessed August 1, 2018, http://safaat.lectu.re.ub.ac.id/files/2014/03/
Kekuatan-Mengikat-dan-Pelaksanaan-Putusan-MK.pdf.
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without the need for further action in the form of the need to implement the 
amended law, this decision can be said to be self-executing,15 in the sense that 
the decision is carried out by itself. This happens because the negated norm 
has certain characteristics that can be applied automatically without changes or 
with changes in laws that contain the norms reviewed and negated. In the end, 
the decision to review the law is not only directly executable but also those that 
cannot be directly executed (not self-executing). This is one of the dynamics that 
occur related to the shift in the character of the Constitutional Court’s decision 
regarding the review of the law.
The example of the Constitutional Court’s decision which can be said to 
be non self-executing is the Constitutional Court Decision Number 110-111-
112-113/PUU-VII/2009 concerning the Determination of Seats Phase II in the 
2009 Legislative Elections. The material review related to the ruling on Article 
205 paragraph (4) and Article 212 paragraph (3) of Law Number 10 Year 2008 
concerning General Elections for Members of the People’s Legislative Assembly, 
the Regional Representative Council and the Regional People’s Representative 
Council. At the level of implementation, this decision still requires legal 
instruments that are operational. This is due to the fact that in the ruling, the 
Court issued a ruling with the effect of retroactive laws for the first time. So, the 
Constitutional Court’s decision is very clear in its execution requires regulations 
to “turn on” the retroactive provisions made by the Constitutional Court.
The dynamics that occur as mentioned above, regarding the changes in 
the character of the Constitutional Court’s decision are basically influenced by 
Indonesia’s political conditions which influence the Constitutional Court Judges. 
The Constitutional Court Judge must try to find legal breakthroughs in the 
corridor of judicial activism to create an applicable Constitutional Court decision. 
Adressat’s16 decision which often ignores the Constitutional Court’s decision and 
policy makers who seem not to comply with the Constitutional Court’s decision 
15 Maruarar Siahaan, “Peran Makamah Konstitusi dalam Penegakan Hukum Konstitusi [The Role of Constitutional 
Court in Law Enforcement of the Constitution],” Journal of Hukum 16, no. 3 (July 2009): 364.
16 Adressat can be interpreted as a party affected by these norms. Based on this understanding, the authors 
interpret the decision adressat is the party affected by the enforcement of the decision, especially the decision 
of the Constitutional Court.
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makes the Constitutional Court’s decision cannot be implemented so as to 
create a state that remains unconstitutional. Law is indeed a political and legal 
product that underlies policies. So it cannot be denied that politics influence 
the policies made. On this basis, the Constitutional Court Judges finally created 
a variant of the decision as explained so that inevitably policy makers must 
follow up. If the decision on the dispute over the results of the general election, 
the decision of the Constitutional Court will affect the political constellation in 
Indonesia differently from the decision of the judicial review. The decision in its 
implementation was strongly influenced by the political constellation. The law 
is a product of politics itself so that decisions related to this matter will also be 
influenced by the ongoing political constellation.
Based on the above background, the problem raised in this study is whether 
the political constellation in Indonesia affects the shift in the character of the 
Constitutional Court’s decision from self-executing to non-self-executing and 
does it have a legal impact on the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s 
decision?
II. RESULT & DISCUSSION
2.1. Origin of the Concept of Self Executing to Non-Self Executing
The Constitutional Court has affirmed itself as a guardian of democracy 
which upholds the principles of substantive justice in every decision,17 therefore 
the Court is judged as a judicial institution whose performance and authority 
are guided by the enforcement of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy. 
The Constitutional Court also functions as a derivation of its citizens, namely 
as the guardian of constitution, the interpreter of constitution, the protector 
of citizen constitutional rights and the protector of human rights.18 The court 
17 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, “Mengawal Demokrasi Menegakkan Keadilan Substantif 
[Guarding Democracy Upholding Substantive Justice]” (Jakarta: Annual Report of Constitutional Court, 2009), 8.
18 Badan Pembangunan Hukum Nasional, ”Efektivitas Peran Mahkamah Konstitusi Sebagai Penjaga Konstitusi 
(Perspektif Pembinaan Hukum dan Demokrasi) [The Effectiveness of the Role of the Constitutional Court as the 
Guardian of the Constitution (Perspective of Law and Democracy Development)],” Paper presented in Continuing 
Legal Education (CLE) at the Center for Research and Development of BPHN, (Ministry of Law and Human 
Rights, dated, May 3, 2013, Jakarta), 2.
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accepts that the constitution protects, by implication, measures of freedom of 
political communication and resolves the main contours of the doctrine.19
The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the Constitutional 
Court Law affirm that the Constitutional Court is a court of first and final level 
whose decisions are final and binding. Article 24C Paragraph (1) of the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia states, among other things, “The 
Constitutional Court has the authority to try at the first and final level whose 
decisions are final.” Article 47 of the Constitutional Court Law states, “The 
Constitutional Court Decision obtains permanent legal force since its completion 
in the open plenary session for the public." As determined by determined by 
Article 47 that the decision is directly binding since it was pronounced at the 
plenary session open to the public.
The effect of the existence of the Constitutional Court’s decision which has 
permanent legal power is that it is prospective looking forward and not backward 
looking.20 This means that all legal actions that were previously considered 
legitimate or illegitimate did not turn out to be illegitimate or become valid only 
because the Constitutional Court’s decision was binding since the pronunciation 
in the plenary session was open to the public. Legal actions carried out based 
on laws that have not been declared as having no binding legal force are legal 
actions that are legally valid, including the consequences of legal acts that are 
also legally valid. Though civil law countries usually have different specialized 
courts with well-defined jurisdictions (such as administrative, tax, or labor), 
these tend to be depoliticized and fairly deferential to the other branches of 
government. The constitutional courts, however, appear more political and 
qualitatively different from regular courts-hardly surprising since one goal of the 
Kelsenian theory was insulation of ordinary courts from politics.21
The final nature of the Constitutional Court’s decision shows that the 
Constitutional Court’s decision directly obtained legal force and the Constitutional 
19 Cheryl Saunders, “The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
13, no.1 (Winter 2006): 43.
20 Jimly Asshiddiqie, Hukum Acara Pengujian Undang-Undang [Procedural Law of Constitutional Review] (Jakarta: 
Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan MK, 2005), 318-319.
21 Donald P. Kommers, “An Introduction to the Federal Court,” German Law Journal 2, no.9 (2001): 30.
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Court’s decision had legal consequences for all parties relating to the decision. 
This is because the Constitutional Court’s decision is different from the general 
court ruling which only binds parties (inter parties). All parties must comply 
with and implement the Constitutional Court’s decision. In the Constitutional 
Court’s decision related to the judicial review of the law for example, if the 
Constitutional Court decides an Act against the Constitution and declares it 
has no binding power, the decision is not only binding on the party who filed a 
case in the Constitutional Court but also binding for all citizens (erga omnes).22 
Besides that the Constitutional Court ruling also applies the principle of res 
judicata pro veritatehabetur, meaning that the judge’s decision must be considered 
correct and must be carried out. So that there is no reason not to carry out the 
Constitutional Court’s decision, even without any forced efforts by any party to 
carry out the Constitutional Court Decision (the principle of self-respect).23 The 
Constitutional Court is also due to being the first and last court, so there is no 
other legal effort that can be taken. A decision if no legal remedy can be taken 
means that it has a permanent legal force (in kracht van gewijsde) and obtains 
a binding force (resjudicata pro veritatehabetur).24
The decision of the Constitutional Court since it was pronounced before a 
court that is open to the public can have three powers, namely:25
2.1.1. Binding Power
The power of binding on the Constitutional Court’s ruling is different from that 
of an ordinary court, not only includes parties who are litigants, namely the 
applicant, government, House of Representatives (DPR)/ House of Regional 
Representatives (DPD), or related parties who are permitted to enter the 
proceedings, but the decision is also binding on all people, state institutions, 
22 Machmud Aziz, “Pengujian Peraturan Perundang-Undangan dalam Sistem Peraturan Perundang-Undangan Indo-
nesia [Judicial Review in the Indonesian Legislation System],” Journal of Konstitusi 7, no. 5 (October 2010): 132.
23 Widodo Ekatjahjana, “Mencermati Ratio Decendi MK dalam Putusan Nomor 122/PUU-VII/2009 tentang Pendero-
gasian Norma Hukum dan Sifat Putusan PTUN [Observing Ratio Decendi in Decision Number 122/PUU-VII/2009 
concerning the Derogation of Legal Norms and the Character of PTUN Decisions],” Journal of Konstitusi 7, no. 
5 (October 2010): 8.
24 Fajar Laksono Soeroso, “Aspek Keadilan dalam Sifat Final Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi [The Justice Aspect in 
the Final Nature of the Constitutional Court’s Decision],” Journal of Konstitusi 11, no. 1 (March 2014): 66.
25 Maruarar Siahaan, Hukum Acara Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia [The Procedural Law of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2012), 214.
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and legal entity within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.This applies 
as a law as created by law makers. Constitutional Court Judges are said to 
be negative legislators whose decisions are erga omnes, aimed at all people.
2.1.2 Strength of Proof
Article 60 of the Constitutional Court Law stipulates that the material 
contained in the paragraph, article and/or part of the law that has been 
reviewed cannot be appealed for review. Thus, the decision of the Court 
that has reviewed a law is a proof that can be used that has obtained a 
definite power (gezag van gevijsde). It is said that the definite strength or 
gezag van gevijsde can be negative or positive. The definite strength of a 
decision is negatively interpreted as saying that the judge may no longer 
decide on a case for an application that was previously decided as referred 
to in Article 60 of the Law of the Constitutional Court. In civil law, this 
is interpreted, only if the same party is submitted with the same subject 
matter. In relation to the constitutional case whose verdict is erga omnes, 
the petition for reviewing the same material has been decided. The decision 
of the Constitutional Court which has the legal power to remain so can be 
used as a positive proof of force with certainty that what has been decided by 
the judge has been considered correct. The opposite proof is not permitted.
2.1.3 Executorial Strength
As a legal act of a state official intended to end a dispute that will nullify 
or create a new law, then, of course, it is expected that the decision is not 
only dead words on paper. As a judge’s decision, each person will then talk 
about how it will be implemented in reality. However, as mentioned above, 
it is different from the ordinary judge’s decision, then a decision that has 
been binding on the parties in a civil case gives the party won the right to 
request that the verdict be executed if it concerns the punishment of the 
loser to do something or pay a sum of money. In such a case it is said that 
the decision that has permanent legal force has executive strength, namely 
that the decision is carried out and if necessary by force.
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The problem arises when the power mentioned above is only oriented 
to the normative reality, whereas in reality the decision of constitutional 
review only ends without proper implementation. The execution of the 
ruling of the Constitutional Court has been deemed to have materialized 
with the announcement of the decision into the State Gazette as ordered by 
Article 57 paragraph (3) of the Law of the Constitutional Court. Of course, 
this is an ambiguous matter considering the function of the Constitutional 
Court as a guardian of the constitution, not only as a mere constitutional 
jewelry. Therefore it is not surprising that when in its development the 
Constitutional Court positioned itself as a positive legislature in several 
decisions of constitutional review. Even this reflects that the Constitutional 
Court judges tried to apply judicial activism in their decisions to take legal 
breakthrough steps to minimize politicization in the implementation of the 
Constitutional Court’s decision.
The Constitutional Court Decision which states that an article does 
not have binding legal force must be contained in the State Gazette within 
a period of no later than 30 (thirty) working days after the decision is 
pronounced (Article 57 paragraph (3) of the Constitutional Court Law). 
The link between the revision and amendment to the law has absolutely 
nothing to do with the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decision. 
The amendment to the Act is carried out only to synchronize with the 
articles which have been declared as having no legal force binding by the 
Constitutional Court. The implementation of the null and void decision 
model that can be directly implemented (self-executing) is the initial design 
of the existence of a constitutional court whose decision eliminates a norm 
if it is contrary to the constitution. The existence of the Constitutional 
Court as a negative legislator, as introduced by Hans Kelsen is through a 
statement to abolish a legal situation (declaratory) by not requiring a special 
apparatus to carry out a declaratory decision. Decisions stating the material 
content of articles, paragraphs, or parts of the law, even the law as a whole 
is contrary to the constitution and does not have binding legal force can 
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be automatically removed from the relevant law and no longer valid. In 
general, the decisions of the Constitutional Court that are self-executing can 
be found in the decision model that legally revokes and states that they are 
not valid (null and void).26 The Constitutional Court’s decision in  reviewing 
constitutional declaratory laws means that the Constitutional Court ruling 
eliminates a new legal situation or establishes a new law as a negative-
legislator.27 Declarative nature does not require one apparatus to carry out 
the decision of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court, because 
of its authority in adjudicating at the first and last level whose decisions 
are final and binding to examine the law against the constitution, has the 
right to interpret the constitution (the final interpreter of the constitution).28 
Over time, not all of the Constitutional Court’s decisions that granted the 
petitioners’ petition could be directly implemented (self-executing) because 
in the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decision it still needed 
follow-up with the formation of new laws, amendments to the law or the 
formation of other legislation. This is a decision called non-self executing. 
This happens because the decision has influenced other norms and requires 
revisions or the formation of new laws or regulations that are more operational 
in its implementation, in other words, this decision cannot be immediately 
implemented (non-self executing) without legislation new or other legislative 
products because it creates a legal vacuum.
The statement above arises because the Constitutional Court’s decision 
is now approaching the positive nature of the legislature. In this matter, 
Kelsen distinguished the legislative functions carried out by parliament and 
the courts. Parliament is a positive legislator because the parliament has 
the constitutional authority to make the law based on its own policy base, 
while the judiciary that has the authority to examine the law is negative 
26 Syukri Asyari, et. Al., “Model dan Implementasi": 694.
27 A. Fickar Hadjar, et.al., Pokok-Pokok Pikiran dan Rancangan Undang-Undang Mahkamah Konstitusi [Principles 
and Thoughts and Draft Law of the Constitutional Court] (Jakarta: KRHN dan Kemitraan, 2003), 34.
28 According to Jimly Asshiddiqie, the authority of the Constitutional Court can be related to the six functions of 
the Constitutional Court, one of which is as the Final Interpreter of Constitution. Jimly Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi 
Ekonomi [Economic Constitution] (Jakarta: Kompas Press, 2010), 50.
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legislator because the judiciary carries out legislative functions in order to 
annul the law, an action that Kelsen considered as making a law negatively.29 
Nevertheless, Kelsen has warned from the beginning that the differentiation 
of parliamentary legislative functions from the judiciary as a positive legislator 
and negative legislator will fade when the judiciary enters the territory to 
protect the constitutional rights of citizens. The judiciary when examining 
cases in order to protect constitutional rights will explore and seek a measure 
of the scope of constitutional rights. In this context, the court will become 
omnipotent super legislators.30
Kelsen’s prediction above finally came true. The Constitutional Court 
in its practice in various countries tasked with protecting the constitutional 
rights of citizens changed to positive legislators. Christian Behrendt has 
conducted a research with a comparative approach that is concerned with 
the development of the model of decisions by the Constitutional Court in 
Belgium, France, and Germany where the judicial decisions contain an order 
to the parliament to draft legislation in accordance with the decision. In his 
final conclusion, Behrendt stated emphatically that there was no other choice 
but to ignore the negative theory of the legislator. This conclusion directs 
that the role of the court which has been so large in the legislative process 
emphasizes the position of the court which is also a positive legislator.31 The 
deviation from the restriction of the style of the decision by the Constitutional 
Court by giving rise to several variants of the decision on the consideration of 
realizing substantive justice was apparently regarded as a form of arrogance 
by the House of Representatives (DPR). This can be seen when Law Number 
8 of 2011 concerning Amendment to Law Number 24 of 2003 concerning 
the Constitutional Court in Article 57 paragraph (2a) implicitly stipulates 
that the Constitutional Court is ‘prohibited’ to create a variant of a decision 
29 Hans Kelsen, Teori Umum Hukum dan Negara [General Theory of Law and State] (Jakarta: Bee Media, 2007), 
327-328.
30 Alec Stone Sweet, “The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe,” International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 5, no. 1 (January 2007): 62-69.
31 Christian Behrendt, “Le JugeConstitutionnel, Un Législateur – Cadre Positif (The Constitutional Judge: A Positive 
Law Maker-Framework)” (Ph.D dissertation, University of Paris, 2005), 14-16.
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that is not in accordance with the corridor of restriction as that has been 
set. The provisions are as follows:
Article 57
The verdict of the Constitutional Court whose verdict stated that the 
content of paragraph, article and/or section of the law contradicted the 
1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the material contained in 
the paragraph, article and/or section of the law had no power binding law.
The decision of the Constitutional Court which has its decision stated 
that the establishment of the said law does not fulfill the provisions for the 
establishment of laws based on the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia, the law does not have binding legal force.
(2a) The decision of the Constitutional Court does not contain:
Amber other than as referred to in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2); 
order to the legislator; and the formulation of norms as a substitute 
for the norms of the law which are stated to be contrary to the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
DPR felt that the decision variant that was often raised by the 
Constitutional Court castrated the legislative position as a positive legislator, 
so DPR then revised the Constitutional Court Law and regulated the 
provisions as above. But the ambition of forming this law was then broken 
by the Constitutional Court through its decision stating that the provision 
was contrary to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia through 
the Constitutional Court’s decision. This is found in the Constitutional Court 
Decision Number 48/PUU-IX/2011 concerning review of Law Number 8 of 
2011 concerning Amendments to Law Number 24 of 2003 concerning the 
Constitutional Court. In consideration of the court point [3.13] stated that 
the provisions of Article 57 paragraph (2a) of Law 8/2011 are contrary to 
the purpose of establishing the court to uphold law and justice, especially 
in the context of enforcing the constitutionality of the norms of the law in 
accordance with the constitution. The existence of Article 57 paragraph (2a) 
of Law 8/2011 results in the obstruction of the court from (i) reviewing the 
Shifting the Character of the Constitutional Court Decision Influenced by Political Constellation in Indonesia
343Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
constitutionality of norms; (ii) filling the legal vacuum as a result of the 
Court’s ruling which states that a norm is contrary to the constitution and 
does not have binding legal force.
Apart from the polemic above, the existence of a decision variant raised 
by the Constitutional Court can show the existence of non-self executing. The 
implementation of decisions that are non-self executing can be understood 
still requires the next stage, namely the follow-up by the executor of the 
decision both through the legislative and regulatory processes. The variant of 
the decisions mentioned earlier is essentially temporary (einmalig) until the 
executor of the Constitutional Court’s decision takes over in the formation or 
revision of the legislation. This reflects the shift in the character of some of 
the Constitutional Court’s decisions from self-executing to non-self executing.
2.2. Political Constellation in the Context of the Constitutional Court 
Decision
Judicial power is always inherent in politics, and basically, it is identical 
with concepts such as influence, persuasion, manipulation, coercion, force, 
and authority. In this context the nature of power can be reviewed into six 
dimensions, first, the potential and actual dimensions mean that one can have 
the potential for power, such as wealth, land, weapons, knowledge, social status, 
popularity and so on. Next, the dimensions of consensus and coercion are the 
two contradictory concepts. In the dimension of coercion, politics will be seen as 
a form of struggle, domination, and conflict, while the dimension of consensus, 
power is more interpreted as an effort to unite these various conflicts and make 
it a situation to organize society in general.32 For information that some scholars 
argue that Constitutional Court adopts strong form of constitutional review in 
deciding cases concerning economic and social rights.33
32 Susanto Polamolo, “Nalar Fenomenologi; Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Pusaran Kekuasaan dan Bahaya Krisis 
Weltanschauung [Phenomenology of Reason; The Constitutional Court in the Weltanschauung Crisis of Power 
and Danger],” Journal of Konstitusi 11, no. 2 (June 2014): 226.
33 Philippa Venning, “Determination of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by the Indonesian Constitutional Court,” 
Australian Journal of Asian Law 10, no. 1 (2008): 100-132.
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The power constellation in Indonesia gives us a picture of a ‘tradition of 
political hegemony’, as mentioned earlier, that the Constitutional Court will be 
confronted with this tradition of hegemony based on articles which mention the 
duties and authority. The political tradition that is meant here is the question of 
the impossibility of a purely separate judicial institution with two other institutions 
(executive and legislative). Therefore, Article 18 of Law No. 24 of 2003 openly 
implies an exclusive relationship from each institution; this is where the reality of 
a hegemonic tradition is developing in a structural and administrative direction. 
In the power orientation, Indonesian politics before and after the reformation 
cannot be said to experience significant changes, where it can be measured in an 
orientation perspective. The main orientation of Indonesian politics still revolves 
around the idea of  power and not the effectiveness of power use. This is really 
surprising because power struggles can only be justified if it can be shown that 
in practice they are able to use power exercise in a way that brings benefits to 
as many people as possible.34
The study proves that law is a political product so the character of the 
contents of each legal product will be very determined or colored by the balance 
of power or political configuration that gave birth to it. A fact that cannot be 
denied, that the formation of law in a country including in Indonesia cannot 
be separated from the influence of the prevailing political system, including in 
this case the influence of the national political system of the country itself.35
Events that occur in the contextual context in this matter regarding the 
Constitutional Court’s decision, it does not necessarily make the Constitutional 
Court’s decision directly understood deterministically-empirically, that is, from 
the judge’s decision then trigger the implementation that is in accordance with 
34 In the case of Indonesia, it is very evident that the impetus for power struggles is far higher than the impetus for 
the right use of power. Symptoms such as the emergence of so many political parties are intensively consolidat-
ing themselves to form external organ units, on the other hand, the parties that consolidate with the support 
of a broad constituency actually experience a split into (internal fractioning). There is a complicated typology 
in this section, but from the large currents of political power that are currently consolidating, on the one hand, 
they weaken each other’s positions, which is due to political institutionalization being sacrificed in favor of 
political personalization. See the comparison study in Saiful Arif, Demokratisasi Sistem Politik dan Pemerintahan 
[Democratization of Political and Government Systems] (Aveross Press, 2011), 38.
35 Atom Ginting Munthe, “Postur ‘Rasionalis’ dalam Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Pasca Suharto [’Rationalist’ 
Posture in Post-Suharto Indonesian Foreign Policy],” Law Journal of Pro Jusitia 24, no. 3 (July, 2006): 191-202.
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the decision’s conclusions and finally leads to changes in the implementation of 
state affairs. As well as the development of political thought which is capable of 
encouraging various constitutional structure inventions, the same thing applies 
to the implementation of the Constitutional Court decisions that are influenced 
by the existing political process.
Ideally, the establishment of the Constitutional Court in Indonesia aims to 
strengthen the protection of constitutional democracy. The state, in this case, 
the Indonesian government, must guarantee the fulfillment of the constitutional 
rights of its citizens which have historically been suppressed by integralist policies 
and political authoritarianism of the New Order regime. As for the trend of 
modern state administration, government policy is outlined in a written positive 
law formulation which is the result of political representation of the people’s 
representatives, and which then applies to the public.36
A number of decisions of the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutional 
review indirectly have encouraged the political process. This is one of the 
legal consequences of the Constitutional Court’s decision which has a role in 
encouraging the political process to change the law. One of the legal consequences 
that can be caused by a Constitutional Court decision is that it can nullify or 
create a political process, to ensure that the prevailing political practices continue 
in accordance with the constitutional corridor.
Although the decision is final and binding, but the reality is sometimes 
that the decision of the Constitutional Court is not obeyed or canceled by 
the legislator. The House of Representatives and the President as legislators 
have no Constitutional Court ruling. Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning the 
Establishment of Legislation, one of the materials for the completion of the 
law is a follow-up to the decision of the Constitutional Court. These conditions 
cause the Constitutional Court’s decision as if it has no meaning because there 
is no role for legislators (DPR and President) who cannot and do not follow 
36 Yance Arizona, et.al., Pancasila dalam Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi (Kajian terhadap Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi 
dalam Perkara yang Berkaitan dengan Perlindungan Hak Kelompok Marjinal) [Pancasila in the Constitutional Court’s 
Decision (Study of the Constitutional Court’s Decision in Case Related to Protecting the Rights of Marginalized 
Groups)] (Jakarta: Epistema Institute, 2014), 5-6.
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up on the Constitutional Court’s decision. Therefore, it is necessary to find a 
solution to the ruling of the Constitutional Court in making the law for the 
Constitution can be obeyed by the legislator.37 The substance of the politically 
charged law can be used by law, with expectations that occur in accordance 
with the will of the community, and also in accordance with the will of the 
Constitution. Therefore, those who consider their constitutional rights and/or 
authorities to be disadvantaged as a result of their decision to act can exercise 
the judicial review of the Constitutional Court. The constitutional rights referred 
to the rights stipulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. 
This judicial review is important in order to maintain law order so that there 
is no material conflict between conventions. The decision of the Constitutional 
Court which discusses the making of the law with the 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia was conveyed to the House of Representatives, the Regional 
Representative Council, the President, and the Supreme Court.
Submission of the Constitutional Court’s rules to the DPR and the President 
can force state institutions and law-making institutions immediately follow up 
on the decision of the Constitutional Court. Although the Constitutional Court 
decision is final and binding, the reality is that sometimes the Constitutional 
Court’s decision is not followed up by DPR or the President. 
For example, the decision of the Constitutional Court Number 10/PUU-VI/2008 
concerning a judicial review case of Article 12 letter c of Law Number 10 of 2008 
concerning General Elections of Members of the People’s Legislative Assembly, 
Regional Representatives Council, and Regional People’s Representative Council 
(the Election Law of the DPR, DPD and DPRD/Regional Peoples Representatives 
Council). Article 12 of Law Number 10 Year 2008 that does not include domicile 
and non-political party requirements for prospective DPD members, and Article 
67 of Law Number 10 Year 2008 which does not contain provisions on the need 
for a National Identity Card (KTP) in the province to be represented and Non-
37 Widayati, “Problem Ketidakpatuhan terhadap Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi tentang Pengujian Undang-Undang 
[Problems of Non-Compliance with the Constitutional Court’s Decision Regarding Judicial Review],” Journal of 
Pembaharuan Hukum IV, no. 1 (January - April 2017): 2.
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political party approval for the completeness of the requirements for prospective 
DPD members. This means that what is being requested by the applicant is the 
absence of norms and non-party political norms in Article 12 and Article 67 of 
Law Number 10 Year 2008, not the norms that are formulated in full in article, 
paragraph, or part of the law. In its ruling, the Constitutional Court stated that 
Article 12 letter c of Law Number 10 Year 2008 remained constitutional as long 
as it is interpreted in the province to be represented. The subject of debate is 
Law Number 8 of 2012 concerning the Election of Members of the DPR, DPD, 
and DPRD, the terms of domicile of the DPD members are still regulated, 
namely in Article 12 (c) that is approved, “residing in the territory of the Unitary 
Republic of Indonesia”. The sound of the provision is the same as the sound of 
the article in the law that has been cancelled by the court. Likewise in the latest 
law, Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections. The a quo law may 
not be interpreted by the Constitutional Court which requires the provision of 
candidates for DPD members to remain constitutional in the provinces to be 
represented. This is a form of discrepancy in the follow-up to the Constitutional 
Court’s decision because the norm returned by the Constitutional Court. This 
is not following Article 10 paragraph (1) of Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning 
the Formation of Regulations that contain material that must be regulated by 
laws and regulations which contain all provisions concerning applicable laws 
and regulations.
Even though the Constitutional Court’s ruling is erga omnes, it is not a 
constitutional court ruling that is not only for judicial review applicants who 
request the use of the law but also for all parties related to the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling. The Constitutional Court as a judicial institution for its decisions 
is obeyed and acted upon, because it is a legal responsibility for the legislators, 
and also the implementation of the decision on constitutional formation for 
citizens granted by the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. In 1945, 
especially those who wanted to hear the review of the Constitutional Court.
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2.3. Legal Impact of Disobedience of the Constitutional Court’s Decision
According to Achmad Ali, the legal consequences are a result given by law, 
for an act of legal subject. Furthermore, he identified legal consequences in 3 
(three) groups:38
2.3.1. Legal consequences in the form of birth, change or disappearance of 
certain legal rules;
2.3.2. Legal consequences in the form of birth, change or disappearance of a 
particular legal relationship; and
2.3.3. Legal consequences in the form of sanctions.
Non-compliance with the decisions of the Constitutional Court can be 
implemented because there are no instruments or institutions that provide 
legal responsibilities that are final and binding. The final decision and all the 
Constitutional Courts are very beneficial for everyone outside the Constitutional 
Court to follow up on the final and binding decision.39 Although in Article 24C 
paragraph (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945 only states 
that the decision of the Constitutional Court is final, it is not followed by the 
word “binding”, but it can be stated that the final decision of the Constitutional 
Court means relating to the decision of the Constitutional Court, once the verdict 
was finished. The basis for the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s 
ruling on those relating to the decision, to separate the decision, without any 
coercion. Therefore, it is the implementation of the Constitutional Court ruling, 
moral awareness and also legal awareness of the relevant institutions.40 The 
implementation of the Constitutional Court’s ruling is also automatic, not the 
executing agency. Therefore moral awareness and also legal awareness for parties 
related to the Constitutional Court’s ruling, because the implementation of the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling is also a constitutional obligation for the parties 
related to the decision of the Constitutional Court. The implementation of the 
38 Achmad Ali, Menguak Tabir Hukum (Suatu Kajian Filosofis & Sosiologis) [Revealing the Veil of Law (A Philosophical 
& Sociological Study)] (Jakarta: PT. Toko Buku Agung, 2002), 251.
39 Bachtiar, Problematika Implementasi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi pada Pengujian UU terhadap UUD [Problems 
with the Implementation of the Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Constitutional Review] (Jakarta: Raih Asa 
Sukses, 2015), 233.
40 Ibid.
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Constitutional Court’s ruling is automatic and there is no institution responsible 
for resolving the Constitutional Court’s ruling. There is no provision for parties 
who do not and do not follow up on the decisions of the Constitutional Court. 
The disobedience of litigants, including the legislative bodies implementing 
the Constitutional Court’s ruling, can in some way affect the rules, and even if 
repeated non-compliance occurs, the community is increasingly disadvantaged 
for the Constitutional Court. When the problem is made by the Constitutional 
Court’s decision to continue as it is now, it can be a future, and the Constitutional 
Court will be issued by justice seekers. The problem is, there are no formal rules 
or regulations that govern the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s 
ruling. The House of Representatives and the Government as parties directly 
related to the decision of the Constitutional Court, namely responding to and 
carrying out the decisions of the Constitutional Court, immediately follow up. 
Therefore, to maintain legal order with regulations that stipulate that its hierarchy 
is lower must not be contradictory to higher regulations, it will attach laws with 
laws that cost contrary to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, 
the DPR and the President must immediately be obeyed and acted upon by the 
President to immediately amend the law to be adjusted to the decision of the 
Constitutional Court.
In the judiciary tradition that has been developing for a long time, a decision 
must have binding nature, because this is related to the absolute authority of 
the judiciary, which has the power to make judgments. Of course it is useless if 
a decision that takes the process sometimes takes a very long and tiring tempo, 
but in the end, it does not have binding legal force, the result is just a waste. 
Problems at the level of implementation/execution of decisions like this are 
often the organs of the Constitutional Court, because there is no executorial 
institution for the decisions of the two courts, and there is no threat of serious 
sanctions if they do not implement the decisions of both organs.41 During this 
time the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s ruling only relied on good 
41 Denny Indrayana and Zainal Arifin Mochtar, “Komparasi Sifat Mengikat Putusan Judicial Review Mahkamah 
Konstitusi dan Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara [Comparison of the Binding of Judicial Review Decisions of the 
Constitutional Court and the State Administrative Court],” Journal of Mimbar Hukum 19, no. 3 (October 2007): 
442-443.
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cooperation/relations between the Constitutional Court as an institution judicial 
with the legislating organs (DPR and the President), as well as the implementing 
organs of the law (government). If there are no good intentions from the three 
organs, which are affected by the implications of the Constitutional Court’s 
decision, of course, the Constitutional Court’s decision will only be a waste, or 
just become a paper tiger, which has no implementation power.
Judicial power is the weakest branch of the three branches of power that exist; 
therefore its authority is only as a case breaker. The rest to execute the decisions 
issued, the judicial organ requires the intervention of the executive to become 
the executor. Although the Constitutional Court currently has extraordinarily 
high authority, namely as an authoritative organ to conduct the constitutional 
review, which means that it serves to limit and supervise other state organs to 
run in the corridors set by the constitution, but it cannot guarantee guarantee 
the implementation of the provisions outlined by the Constitutional Court. Even 
it is often denied. Especially now with the tendency towards judicial activism, 
where the role of the judicial institution as the guarantor of the constitution 
will be increasingly dominant, the decision of the Constitutional Court will 
be subject to fierce challenges from non-judicial state actors affected by the 
Constitutional Court’s decision.
Therefore, the constitution and the regulation that regulates the authority of 
the Constitutional Court in listing final words are always followed by the final 
and binding words. These courts can persuade other government bodies that their 
judgment is substantially in line with the practices of other democratic countries.42 
Although it has been stated explicitly, the decisions of the Constitutional Court 
are denied or ignored by the legislating organs and/or other non-judicial actors, 
especially if the two words are not stated side by side and explicitly, it is possible 
to interpret that the decisions are the final is not necessarily binding, because 
there are no provisions that explicitly regulate it.43 The actual impact of judicial 
42 Taavi Annus, “Comparative Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and Strategy of Selecting the Right Arguments,” 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 14, no.2 (2004): 344.
43 Ahmad Syahrizal, “Problem Implementasi Putusan MK [Problems of the implementation of the Constitutional 
Court’s Decision],” Journal of Konstitusi 4, no. I (March 2007): 115.
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decisions often depends on the behavior of executive and legislative bodies that 
implement the rulings. Consequently, when a court hears a case involving the 
interests of those controlling the executive and legislative institutions, those 
interests can threaten to obstruct the court intended outcome. This is also evident 
from several Constitutional Court decisions that are not applicable because they 
seem to be ignored by the decision address. Based on the analysis conducted on 
the constitutional court’s decisions related to forestry, plantations, and mining, 
it can be said that the level of compliance of state administrators can be seen 
based on whether or not a constitutional court decision is granted which is 
either partially or wholly by state administrators, DPR, to the judiciary. The 
government and the DPR appear to be more disobedient to the decisions of the 
constitutional court. One of them seemed in the absence of a constitutional court 
decision that cancels a norm in the Plantation Law but it is not accommodated 
by the government and parliament in revising the Plantation Law, then there is 
also no response from the government to the decision the constitutional court 
related to the judicial review of the Forestry Law, especially regarding the issue 
of the mechanism of inauguration and abolition of customary law communities 
as mandated by Article 67 paragraph (1), paragraph (2), and paragraph (3) of the 
Forestry Law which is considered constitutional by the Constitutional Court but 
the government instrument to date mechanism inauguration and abolition of 
indigenous law community does not yet exist. Slightly different from the general 
court that handles criminal acts of natural resources that are more obedient to 
the decisions of the constitutional court by using the decisions of the relevant 
constitutional court as a consideration in deciding cases.44
As a result, the Constitutional Court’s decision is not implementable in 
its character, when it reaches the application stage, the Constitutional Court 
Decision will be blocked by many obstacles that interfere with the execution of 
the decision. Therefore it is necessary to have a collective awareness strategy of all 
44 Adam Mulya Bunga Mayang and Adeline Syahda, Kepatuhan Penyelenggara Negara terhadap Putusan Mahkamah-
Konstitusi (Analisis Terhadap Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi tentang Kehutanan, Pertambangan dan Perkebunan) 
[Compliance of State Administrators on Constitutional Court Decisions (Analysis of Constitutional Court Decisions 
on Forestry, Mining and Plantations)] (Jakarta: Yayasan Konstitusi Demokrasi Inisiatif, 2017), 34.
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state institutions and other non-state organs, to jointly apply the Constitutional 
Court’s decisions to conditions that are clearly desired by the constitution. The 
implementation of the Constitutional Court’s ruling will be very absurd without 
a positive response from the legislative and the government forming organs 
in general. During this time there are often gaps and disparities between the 
stages of reading and the implementation of final decisions in the field. If this 
big problem is left unchecked, undoubtedly the decision of the Constitutional 
Court will only have a symbolic power that adorns the state news sheet.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the discussion above, related to the shift in the character of the 
constitutional court’s decision from self-executing to not self-executing, it came 
to the conclusion that the dynamics were influenced by Indonesia’s political 
conditions which influenced the constitutional court judges. Adressat often 
ignore the decisions of the Constitutional Court and policy makers as if they 
do not obey so that the Constitutional Court’s decision cannot be implemented 
to create a state that remains unconstitutional. The reality is that sometimes 
the Constitutional Court’s decisions are ignored and are not followed up by the 
legislative council of the people and the President as the legislative body. Because 
of it, Constitutional Court judges must try to find legal breakthroughs in the 
corridors of judicial activism to create applicable constitutional review decisions. 
The judges created a decision variant that was more directed to the decision of 
non-self executing. The existence of the nature of non-self executing because to 
carry out the Constitutional Court’s decision still needs to be followed up with 
the next, namely the follow-up by the executor of the decision either through 
the legislative or regulatory process. It was said so because the ruling influenced 
other norms and requested a revision or making new laws or regulations that 
were more operational in their implementation. In other words, this decision 
cannot easily be carried out without the presence of new laws or other regulatory 
products because it can lead to a legal vacuum. This is what reflects the change 
Shifting the Character of the Constitutional Court Decision Influenced by Political Constellation in Indonesia
353Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
like the Constitutional Court from self-executing to non-self executing. In the 
end, the adressat of the decision as a policy maker must inevitably follow up.
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